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CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw-CIVIL RIGHTS Acrs-CIVIL LIABILITY OF STATE OFFICIALS ACTING WITHIN THEIR DISCRETIONARY POWERS-Plaintiff was adjudged mentally ill by a county probate judge and ordered committed to a
state mental hospital in November 1950. The commitment was made pursuant to a petition made out by the county deputy sheriff on the recommendation of a local attorney. In August of 1952, plaintiff was released from the
state mental hospital. He then filed an action in the county circuit court to
test the validity of his commitment. The circuit court found that the commitment was void, because of a failure by the authorities to comply with the
applicable statutory requirements, and granted a permanent injunction
against its enforcement. After a damage action in the state circuit court
against the medical superintendent and the director of receiving at the state
mental hospital had been dismissed,1 plaintiff brought a damage action2

1 The state court action is discussed in Kenny v. Fox, (D.C. Mich. 1955) 132 F. Supp.
305, in an action brought in the federal district court by the plaintiff who sought damages
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in the federal district court against the probate judge who ordered him
committed, the attorney on whose recommendation the petition for commitment was made, and the medical superintendent and director of receiving at the mental hospital. Plaintiff alleged that they had participated at
various times in a series of acts which resulted in his confinement, depriving
him of his civil rights under color of Michigan law but in violation of the
Constitution of the United States. Each defendant filed a motion to dismiss.
Held, granted. The Civil Rights Acts were not intended to give relief against
persons acting in a private capacity or against errors of judgment on the
part of judges of state courts or state executive officials. Kenney v. Hatfield,
(D. C. Mich. 1955) 132 F. Supp. 814.
An increasingly significant problem3 is the extent to which the allinclusive language4 of the Civil Rights Acts has affected the common law
immunity given state officials5-executive, 6 legislative,7 and judicial8-acting
within their discretionary powers.9 With the exception of the local attomey,10 there is no question that the acts of the defendants in the principal
case constituted "state action,"11 yet the court found that they were immune from tort liability under the Civil Rights Acts.12 Although the Civil
Rights Acts originally may have been intended to cover situations similar
to the principal case,13 this sweeping approach has not been favored by the
from the state judge who had dismissed his case. The case in the federal district court was
also dismissed.
2 Under both the Federal Civil Rights Acts, 28 U.S.C. (1952) §1343, 42 U.S.C. (1952)
§1983, and Michigan law. Mich Comp. Laws (1948) §330.l et seq.
3 As reflected in the growing number of cases arising in federal district courts under
the Civil Rights Acts in the years 1945-1953. See tables C-2 in the ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS (1945-1953).
4 R. S. §1979, 42 U.S.C. (1952) §1983, refers to "every person .•." and does not mention any exceptions from its coverage.
5 Some of the reasons for this immunity are given in Jennings, "Tort Liability of Administrative Officers," 21 M1NN. L. REv. 263 at 271-272 (1937). See also 68 HARv. L. REv.
1229 at 1232 (1955); 66 HARv. L. REv. 1285 at 1295, n. 54 (1953).
6 Francis v. Lyman, (1st Cir. 1954) 216 F. (2d) 583. On the common law immunity in
general, see Jennings, "Tort Liability of Administrative Officials," 21 MINN. L. REv. 263
(1937); Keefe, "Personal Tort Liability of Administrative Officials," 12 FoRD. L. REv. 130
(1943).
7 Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 71 S.Ct. 783 (1951).
8 Randall v. Brigham, 7 Wall. (74 U.S.) 523 (1868); Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall.
(80 U.S.) 335 (1871).
9 For the distinction drawn in regard to their ministerial duties, see Ex parte Virginia,
100 U.S. 339 (1880), where a state judge was held liable under the Civil Rights Acts for such
an act.
10 Since the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 3 S.Ct. 18 (1883), there has been no federal
protection against the acts of private individuals in the field.
11 See Barnett, "What is 'State' Action Under the Fourteenth, Fifteenth, and Nineteenth Amendments of the Constitution?" 24 ORE. L. REv. 227 (1945).
12 A basic distinction seems to have been made between suits for injunctions against
state officials exercising discretionary powers and damage actions brought against state
officials for the exercise of their discretionary powers. See 46 CoL. L. REv. 614 at 618 (1946).
13 See Frank and Munro, "The Original Understanding of 'Equal Protection of the
Laws,'" 50 CoL. L. REv. 131 (1950).
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courts. The majority of the lower federal courts14 have reached the same
result as the court in the instant case, but with some dissent,1 5 and the
Supreme Court has not as yet resolved the conflict. But, on the basis of the
Court's decision in Tenney v. Brandhove,16 where the Court held that the
Civil Rights Acts did not overturn the long tradition of legislative immunity, " . . . it would be absurd to hold, in the application of the Civil
Rights Act, that judicial officers of a state stand in any less favorable position than do state legislators, in respect to immunity from civil liability for
acts done in their official capacity."17 Although there is more question as to
the extent of the immunity given to state executive officials,18 it would be
paradoxical to grant immunity to the judge ordering the commitment and
to impose liability on the doctors enforcing it.19 The decision of the court
in the principal case does not mean that there are no safeguards against the
abuses of state officials acting within their discretionary powers. Such cases
must be viewed in the federal-state context.20 Remedies can be found within the state governmental machinery, appeals, extraordinary writs, elections,
recall and impeachment of judges and officials, and the state official's own
sense of self-restraint.21 The public interest in maintaining strong and independent state officials overrides the need for a civil damage action under the
Civil Rights Acts for an error in the exercise of discretionary authority by a
state official. This is particularly so when, as in the principal case, there has
been no allegation of willful or malicious action or a purposeful effort to deprive the plaintiff of rights guaranteed by the Constitution.

Charles B. Renfrew, S. Ed.

14 Francis v. Crafts, (1st Cir. 1953) 203 F. (2d) 809; Bottone v. Lindsley, (10th Cir.
1948) 170 F. (2d) 705; McGuire v. Todd, (5th Cir. 1952) 198 F. (2d) 60.
15 Picking v. Pennsylvania R. Co., (3d Cir. 1945) 151 F. (2d) 240; McShane v. Moldovan,
(6th Cir. 1949) 172 F. (2d) 1016.
16 341 U.S. 367, 71 S.Ct. 783 (1951).
17 Francis v. Crafts, note 14 supra, at 812. ·
18 See Jennings, "Tort Liability of Administrative Officers," 21 MINN. L. REv. 263
(1937); Keefe, "Personal Tort Liability of Administrative Officials," 12 FoRD. L. REv. 130
(1943).
19 See Francis v. Lyman, note 6 supra, where the court, faced with a similar situation,
reached this result.
20 See the concurring opinion of Justice Frankfurter in Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S.
1 at 16, 64 S.Ct. 397 (1944).
21 This latter, in the opinion of Justice Stone, is the real check on the judiciary. See
his dissent in United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. I at 79, 56 S.Ct. 312 (1936).

